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Abstract
Public credit guarantees attributed to SMEs as a way of boosting credit access have been
widely implemented in developed countries. However, literature often focuses on financial ad-
ditionality. This paper investigates, for Portugal’s case, the impact of these guarantees on the
economic outcomes of firms – we study economic additionality. We utilize firm-level data pro-
vided by Banco de Portugal and rely on propensity score matching methods to derive causal
results. We find evidence that public credit guarantees have incremental effects on credit, em-
ployment, total assets, and fixed assets. There is no evidence of effects on total factor produc-
tivity, wages, or profitability.
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1 Introduction
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) often face credit-constraints due to their difficulty
to post appropriate collateral, making risk assessment a necessity.
The incapacity to provide detailed financial reports makes the risk assessment process harder,
consequently impacting the ability to monitor the firms, and thus making SMEs even riskier from
the banking system perspective. Moreover, access to credit is key for SMEs to develop (OECD,
2020). Credit Guarantee Systems (CGSs) exist as a public policy response to this problem in
most developed countries, including Portugal. Finally, tangible evidence of credit constraints for
Portuguese SMEs has been reported by Farinha and Félix (2015).
For Portugal’s case, the mutual guarantee system is the main policy in usage. It is conducted
mainly by the Portuguese Society for Mutual Guarantees (SPGM, 2018b). The current outstanding
guarantees represented 1.8% of the GDP as of 2017, which by itself makes the case for the need of
scrutiny. The policy is mutualist: SPGM buys a share of the benefited company and the benefited
company is obliged to buy and hold a share of SPGM for as long as the operation takes place.
This risk-sharing aspect is crucial, as it heavily increases the screening of firms that access the
guarantees. Since the firms become shareholders of the society themselves, there is a common
shared goal of prosperity of SPGM – a bankruptcy of the society becomes a negative outcome for
every firm involved.
These policies help credit-constrained firms in obtaining necessary financial means towards
their activity, through the access to government-funded guarantees posted to the banking system.
And for firms that could already access the financial system beforehand, this policy allows access
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to better financing conditions – such as lower interest rates and longer maturities -, which may
be crucial towards the company’s performance. Enhanced access to financing is also of major
importance for dealing with external shocks – the liquidity buffer may be crucial to help viable
firms withstand exogenous shocks.
The available research on the effectiveness of such policies often focuses on financial addi-
tionality – the improvement in the participating firms’ financial outcomes: access to funds, interest
rates, and the improvement on their debt structure. However, improved financing conditions are
not an end in itself – they are a means to an end. The end, or goal, is for firms to achieve economic
performance that they would not be able to otherwise.
Are public credit guarantees in Portugal effective in boosting the economic performance of
SMEs? This is the research question that we will tackle in this work project.
The economic outcomes we are most interested in are firm productivity (we will look at both
labor productivity and total factor productivity), total assets, fixed assets, employment, wages, and
EBITDA. Beforehand, we will also analyze if the policy is effective in providing extra credit to
these firms, as that is a crucial condition to impact the variables mentioned above. These outcomes
will be analyzed by comparison with similar firms that were eligible for the policy but did not
receive it (either because they did not apply or because they were not accepted). The intent is to
measure the economic additionality from the policy.
If the policy is not effective, then there is a distinct chance that public funds are not being
efficiently allocated. Furthermore, consequences at the level of Schumpeterian creative destruction
are also a concern, alongside with policy design that requires improvement.
It is only by examining economic outcomes that it is possible to assert if credit guarantees
are an efficient policy, or a poor form of allocation for public funds.
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By relying on firm level data and employing matching techniques, we find evidence of posi-
tive effects on growth rates of credit, total assets, fixed assets and employment. We find no evidence
of any changes in total factor productivity, wages, or profitability (through EBITDA). Results also
point towards slightly diminished labor productivity growth.
2 The Portuguese Entrepreneurial Scenario
In 2018, SMEs in Portugal represented 99% of the total number of companies in Portugal. The
criteria for this definition are number of employees (maximum of 250) and business volume (max-
imum of 50 million euros) (European Commission, 2020). These firms are responsible for 57%
of the total business volume in Portugal. They are also the most dynamic in terms of creation and
destruction rates over the years, with no pre-existing firms reaching the large-firm definition by
2018, but with 13 SMEs being created for each group of 10 that ceased their activity.
The financial autonomy of SMEs in 2018 was on average 37%, marginally larger than the
ratio for large firms – 35%.
When looking at equity, the concerns are easier to spot. In 2018, 10% of small and medium
enterprises had negative own equity, and microenterprises stand even worse in that ratio at 28%.
On the other hand, only 4% of large firms suffered from this problem (Central de Balanços, 2019).
The focus on public support to SMEs comes from the state aid rules defined by the European
Comission following the Great Recession (Comission, 2009), and are the main reason why the
public guarantees programs took on a much more prominent role after 2008. This fact supports
why the study of the impacts is now so important.
It is possible to see on the 2015 survey on the access to finance of enterprises in the euro area
(SAFE), by OECD (2015), that particularly micro and small firms still struggled to find financing
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Figure 1: Perception of the availability of external financing for euro area enterprises: 2011 to
2017. (OECD, 2018)
in the form of bank loans in the period ranging from 2013 to 2015, with the SAFE survey from
October 2017 to March 2018 (OECD, 2018) showing still the same difficulties for micro enterprises
to access bank loans and credit lines until the trend changes closer to 2017.
The information gathered so far highlights the need to look closely into the challenges being
faced by medium, small and microenterprises, and the role of the policies put in place to help them.
3 Literature Review
Public credit guarantees, provided by credit Guarantee Systems in order to assure bank loans to mi-
cro, small, and medium enterprises, are widely implemented in developed nations, with 33 OECD
countries reporting use of such mechanisms (OECD, 2020). This instrument, that results in a trans-
fer away from banks of part of the associated risk of lending to SMEs, is intended to correct a
market failure, as smaller firms are costly to monitor and, additionally, tend to be undercollater-
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alized and to produce less-detailed financial information (Beck et al., 2008). Without the public
guarantee, the amount of credit to viable SMEs would be too low from a social point of view.
This is reflected on empirical data, with findings of higher financing constraints on SMEs when
compared to large firms (Beck et al., 2005).
CGSs have been built as one possible answer to a framework of financial markets with im-
perfect information leading to credit rationing due to moral hazard and adverse selection issues
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Credit constraints may in fact be so relevant that SMEs see themselves
denied from access to any credit at all without these mechanisms (Berger and Udell, 2006). Differ-
ent lending technologies may improve this situation.
While theoretically sound, most of the schemes do not have precise goals, resulting in diffi-
culties in conducting cost-benefit analysis (Honohan, 2010). The political cycles and short—termist
hazard of policy design also compromises their effectiveness (Honohan, 2010). There is evidence
that the role of the government in these mechanisms is important in respect to funding and manage-
ment, but less so in credit risk assessment and recovery (Beck et al., 2008). Adding to that, even
when state intervention in the credit markets may be welfare-enhancing, it is very contingent on a
careful policy design (Arping et al., 2010). Thus, the impact of credit guarantees on market out-
comes, both on the intensive (e.g. productivity) and extensive margin (e.g. default rates), becomes
an empirical question.
In Portugal, for the years following the financial crisis (2010-2012), Farinha and Félix (2015)
find evidence of SMEs being partially (15% of firms with bank loans) or even totally credit con-
strained (32% of firms with no bank loans). Younger and smaller firms were more affected. Adding
to this, evidence is also presented by Félix (2018) that partially credit-constrained firms in 2010-
2012 were less likely to survive (-1.61 pp), with a negative impact on investment as well (-2.7 pp).
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A recent impact-assessment research conducted by SPGM (2018b) reports that firms benefiting
from the mutual guarantees policy show improvements in total investment rates (+7.5 pp), export
rates (+0.14 pp), job creation (+0.6 pp) and survival rates (+17 to +19 pp). The use of these guaran-
tees also lowers the cost of debt to the median firm (-0.57 pp). Spain follows the same trend, with
reports of increased productivity, higher added value per employee, and higher financial resources
(Garcia-Tabuenca and Crespo-Espert, 2010).
In Italy, earlier research points toward positive results in limiting default rates, attributed to
well-focused policy design that eases credit rationing for the SMEs that need it the most (Zecchini
and Ventura, 2009). More recent research, however, finds no positive impacts of the implemented
schemes, except for a change in the debt structure. Increased probability of default is found, which
may be linked to the fact that the policy failed to reach credit-constrained firms (D’Ignazio and
Menon, 2020). The same applies for France: the firms targeted by credit guarantee policies are
more likely to default (Lelarge et al., 2010).
For South Korea, Oh et al. (2009) found that the credit guarantee policy in place affected
positively the growth of sales, employment, wage levels and survival rate of participant firms; on
the other hand the participant firms have lower productivity and that does not change over time,
with the authors recognizing that the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction is disrupted by
the policy.
The empirical research results are not always consistent, perhaps indicative of the importance
of proper policy design and of accounting for country-specific characteristics.
While most of the defense for CGSs comes from positive financial additionality, a closer look
at economic additionality is necessary, through the outcome variables mentioned in the introduc-
tion.
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“Improvement of firms’ financing terms is not an end in itself, it is expected to lead to im-
proved economic performance.” (SPGM, 2018b).
4 Policy Definition and Framework
The Portuguese Mutual Guarantee System was formed in 1994, as SPGM was founded. It served
as a pilot test to the relevance of a CGS in Portugal. SPGM eventually branched out into four
Mutual Guarantee Societies (MGS) – Norgarante, Lisgarante, Garval (regional) and Agrogarante
(not regional; exclusively dedicated to the agriculture and forestry sector). It became especially
relevant after the 2008 financial crisis. SPGM is the main guarantee provider in Portugal, although
others do exist.
These MGSs oversee access to guarantees, risk assessment and management, and interact
with both local business and the banking system in their designed regions/sectors.
SPGM evolved from being a direct intervenient to becoming a holding company of the four
MGSs, also managing the Mutual Counter-Guarantee Fund (MCGF) which reduces the risk in-
curred by the MGSs through public funding that ensures a counter-guarantee of 50% of the capital
debt. SPGM also has a supportive role in promoting the guarantees system and provides shared
services (e.g., legal aid, business counselling) as support to the four MGSs.
The eligibility criteria1 for access to guarantees provision for SMEs, or firms that are not
SMEs by definition but have a turnover equal to or lesser than C150 M and are not part of business
groups whose consolidated revenue is over C200 M, are as follows:
- Present a positive net worth in the most recent approved balance sheet;
1The full document can be found in SPGM’s webpage (SPGM, 2018a). The document available only details the
2018 program, but the conditions were identical in the years of our analysis.
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- Have no unsolved incidents with the banking system at the time of the emission of the
agreement between both parties;
- Have a regularized situation with the banking system, Fiscal Administration and Social
Security;
Applying firms must also provide access to all relevant information for the correct evaluation
of the operation in terms of risk classification (solvency ratio, leverage ratio, amount of revenues of
the firm). The firms are subject to a double financial screening: by the banking institution granting
the loan, and the MGS that provides the collateral to ensure the loan.
Firms that gain access to the provision of guarantees must also acquire MGS stock, in a value
equal to 2% of the guarantee value (this constitutes the mutualization aspect). This stock can only
be sold after the relationship between the two parties is terminated (SPGM, 2018a).
5 Data Description
Microdata on firms was obtained using the Portuguese Simplified Corporate Information Survey
(Informação Empresarial Simplificada, IES), provided by Bank of Portugal’s Microdata Investiga-
tion Laboratory (BPLIM, 2020). This dataset contains detailed balance-sheet data, as well as profit
and loss data on all of Portugal’s non-financial firms. The years considered for analysis range from
2007 to 2018.
Information about public credit guarantees was provided by the Credit Register Central (Cen-
tral de Registo de Crédito - CRC) of Bank of Portugal (BPLIM, 2019). It provides information on
current outstanding public guarantees for 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.2
2Ideally, data on when the guarantees were originally granted would be most relevant for the analysis, but this
information was not available.
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In the context of the limitations of our data, a firm is considered treated, i.e., benefiting from
public guarantees, if it has an outstanding guarantee in any year between 2014 and 2017.3 Since
credit guarantee programs usually last more than one year, it is likely that companies that have
outstanding guarantees in more than one year present this characteristic precisely due to the policy
we are analysing. With this key assumption, we have 453 treated firms. However, precautions
were taken to ensure that this method is not a major problem. As SPGM (2018b) writes, “The
Portuguese Mutual Guarantee System (. . . ) gained a more prominent status with the 2008 financial
crisis, (. . . ). After an incremental development during the first half of its existence, the crises years
witnessed an exponential growth in the activity of the system, reaching record highs in 2009 and
2010.” To guarantee that our treated firms were not treated in the period of matching, we go the
farthest back possible, to 2007, and perform our match there. This is the furthest back in time
we can go with available data, and as such it should provide an adequate way of matching. It is
highly unlikely, taking into consideration the quote above, that most of the treatment group firms
were treated in 2007. This year also has the added bonus of being prior to the Great Recession,
preventing any further distortions introduced by the event.
We follow a production function approach and thus the study of the impact of the credit guar-
antee system is conducted on eight outcome variables: financial additionality (credit), total assets,
fixed assets (capital), labor productivity, total factor productivity, employment (labor), wages, and
EBITDA (profitability). Our analysis is performed on the additionality of the respective variables.
We do not have access to information on which firms were eligible to the policy but were
denied by SPGM. Therefore, we must build a control group from observational data. Given that we
3The reason to join firms treated on different years is derived from our inability to know exactly when the guaran-
tees were issued. Secondly, there are not enough treated companies in one year that were not treated on the year before,
from 2014 to 2017, to achieve desirable statistical power.
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have access to the entire population of Portuguese firms, we restrict the database following various
criteria.
First, given that the focus of our analysis is on SMEs, we exclude Large eligible firms (i.e.,
those with turnover below 150 000 000 euros), and all other Large firms (not eligible). SMEs that
later progressed into being Large were not excluded– as it is entirely possible that the policy benefit
may impact dimension. Another criterion for policy eligibility is having a positive net result in the
year prior to application, and thus we exclude firms making a loss in any of the years from 2013 to
2016.4 A third criterion requires firms not having overdue bank debt registered in the year of the
application, but we could not request this information in time.
Firms belonging to the autonomous regions of Açores and Madeira are also excluded, as
different policies exist for those regions. There are also firms that reported activity in the financial
sector or public administration. These are excluded since the policy targets only non-financial
SMEs of the private sector. Only firms in operation, with positive assets, sales, and with at least
three paid employees in at least one year are kept in the sample.
Several variables are used for a parsimonious look at firm observed heterogeneity. The firm’s
economic performance is accounted by labor productivity (Gouveia, 2019), total factor productiv-
ity5 (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), investment, turnover, employment through EFTW (Equivalent
Full-Time Workers), fixed assets, total assets, and wages. Equally important for characterization
are the following variables: EBITDA, debt-to-asset ratio, firm sector of activity (using the por-
tuguese code for sectoral activity - CAE), firm age, ability to provide collateral, leverage, existence
4We do not have access to when the guarantee was provided, but in our framework we consider this a safe and
sound proxy.
5The estimation of total factor productivity by the Levinsohn and Petrin method is implemented in STATA with
the help of the -prodest- software by Rovigatti and Mollisi (2018).
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of credit, and share of long-term credit. 6
On the following page, we provide descriptive statistics on the treated and untreated firms for
the year of 2007. A very important point shown in the table is that since we match for 2007 (as
explained below), we have between 339 and 359 firms being analysed, depending on the outcome
variable. The exception is the analysis of financial additionality, which will be restricted to 148
firms.
6Definitions for constructed variables (such as labor productivity, Total Factor Productivity, EFTW, or ratios) can



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The absence of experimental data does not invalidate, with the available statistical methods, that
a robust control group is synthetically built that allows us to infer causal effects. The wealth of
data in our databases, which includes information for the entire population of firms in Portugal,
is particularly well-suited for the task. With this in mind, we seek a synthetic control group that
allows us to make high-quality causal estimations and eases concerns about sample selection effects
possibly taking place.
We rely on the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods proposed by Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin (1983) to build a control group and estimate the causal Average Treatment on the Treated effect
(ATT). The main idea behind matching estimators is that, conditional on a set of observable co-
variates X , the outcomes for the treated (Y T ) and control group (Y C) are independent from the
treatment assignment T , and thus the selection effect is no longer present. This is called the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption (CIA; also known as unconfoundedness), and it is the first of two
main assumptions necessary for employing matching techniques. It can be written as follows:
(Y T , Y C) ⊥ T | X (1)
It is a strong assumption as it relies on the idea that unobserved selection is small or nonex-
istent. It is more credible when there is a large set of data and preprogram data, which is the case
in our setting; and when robustness tests can be performed to lend credibility to the hypothesis that
the hidden selection is not a concern.
The second assumption is Common Support: there must be enough comparison observations
(i.e., untreated) that are a close match on observed characteristics to the treated observations, to
ensure a substantial overlap of propensity score distributions:
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0 < P (T = 1|X) < 1 (2)
Smith and Todd (2005) argue that when the goal is, as in the present paper, to estimate the
ATT, both assumptions can be relaxed, while still maintaining a high-quality matching. Instead of
the aforementioned CIA, we can build on:
Y C ⊥ T | X (3)
And instead of the Common Support assumption we can build on:
Pr(T = 1 | X) < 1 (4)
With this in mind, the ATT can be theoretically written as:
ATT = E[Y T − Y C | T = 1] (5)
As such, the ATT will correspond to the mean difference in outcome between the average
treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect on the untreated.
An essential part for estimating the ATT is matching, which we conduct based on estimated
propensity scores. The Propensity Score is an estimate of the probability of a subject/observation
to be treated, (Ti = 1), as a function of the chosen covariates X . P represents the propensity score:
P = P (X) = Pr[T = 1 | X] (6)
A crucial part of this, is that matching must satisfy the balancing property T ⊥ X | P (X). If
it is satisfied, it means that, regardless of treatment status, observations with the same propensity
score have equal distributions both on observed and unobserved characteristics. If this is valid,
then assignment to treatment can be considered random. We conduct balancing tests on Section 7
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to confirm this.
Taking all of the above into account, the ATT is calculated by comparing the outcome of
a treated unit with the outcome of an untreated unit with the same propensity score. It can be
rewritten as follows:
ATT = EP (X)|T=1(E[Y
T | T = 1, P (Y T )]− E[Y C | T = 0, P (Y C)]) (7)
The Propensity Score can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimators: logit or pro-
bit, after choosing theX covariates that are deemed most relevant. We use the logit estimator, since






And the probability function:
P (T = 1 | X) = 1
1 + exp(−(α + βX))
(9)
There is no guide or mechanical formula to choose what the most relevant covariates are –
they are context specific. We choose covariates following previous literature, also keeping in mind
the relevant outcomes we study. Also, the covariates X are not necessarily the same for every
outcome variable, as noted by Dehejia (2005). On our work, however, we are able to keep a strong
consistency, with few changes in covariates for estimating propensity scores on different outcomes.
In practical terms, we match on ability to provide collateral, share of long-term debt, firm age, firm
sector of activity as defined by the CAE, and debt-to-asset ratio7.
There are several matching techniques that can be used to match treated and untreated obser-
7Debt-to-asset ratio is the only covariate that is not present in all matching procedures.
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vations. We are utilizing Propensity Score Matching on nearest-neighbor8. Based on the propensity
score generated through the logistic distribution, this method searches for the untreated observation
with the closest propensity score to the treated observation, forming a “pair” between them. It is
one of the most frequently used methods in the literature. There is, however, a caveat: it might
be that the untreated “nearest-neighbor” is still very far away in terms of propensity score to the
treated observation. This may result in poor matches. To avoid this, we use a caliper together with
the nearest-neighbor option, which defines the maximum threshold of difference between propen-
sity scores for two observations to be considered a match. In our specific case, we use a caliper of
0.001. This forces the propensity scores for matched observations to be different from one another
by no more than 0.001. We also match with replacement: this means that one untreated observation
may be used as a match to more than one treated observation, if it is the case that it also has the
closest propensity score to that second treated observation. This may imply that a higher number
of untreated observations are dropped, but since we have a very large dataset of untreated observa-
tions, we are not concerned by this. Additionally, we impose common support by dropping treated
observations with a propensity score higher than the maximum or less than the minimum of the
propensity score for untreated observations. Finally, we match on “ties” as well: if there are two or
more untreated observations that have identical propensity score to a treated observation, they are
used in addition to the nearest neighbor.
As we use a two-step estimation process - first the logit model and then the ATT coeffi-
cient estimation -, our standard error estimates should take into account the variance attributable to
both steps, as well as the common support imposition. But when going through our estimations,
8The only exception to this method is on the credit outcome variable. As a lot of our treated firms did not have any
credit in 2007, we lose many treatment-group observations, and thus, lose statistical power. We match on 2 nearest-
neighbors to overcome this issue.
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theoretically we may end up with bad approximations to the true variation of the estimator. A
solution often used is bootstrapping: initially proposed by Efron and Tibshirani (1994), it consists
in drawing random sub-samples from the initial sample and reestimating standard errors with each
sub-sample. However, bootstrapping has never been proved to be valid in this context, and it is be-
coming increasingly debatable (Abadie and Imbens, 2008). Given this, instead of bootstrapping we
follow Abadie and Imbens (2006) and calculate heteroskedasticity-consistent analytical standard
errors.9
The practical implementation of this process is done through STATA, utilizing the -psmatch2-
software by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). It offers many options together with a range of robustness
checks that are important to validate our process.
7 Robustness Checks for assessing matching process quality
These checks are intended to validate our methodology. First, we check the balancing of our
covariates’ means through a two sample t-test. For good balancing, and thus a robust control group,
the t-test between the covariates’ means of the treated and control group after matching should show
no statistically significant differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). After conducting this test, we
can verify on Appendix III that the covariates are well-balanced for most outcomes, with notably
few exceptions.
Austin (2009) indicates that the variance ratio of covariates for treated and control groups
is an additional indicator of good balancing, if the variance ratios are within the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles. This can also be found on Appendix III, and it is true for the majority of the covariates
9Despite this, bootstrapped results are presented in Appendix II for completeness.
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for each outcome variable.10
Another alternative is suggested by Sianesi (2004) indicating that if we have a high-quality
matching, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be lower than the pseudo-R2 obtained from the
original logit estimation. This is true for all of our outcome estimations, with the pseudo-R2 falling
considerably in all of our results.
Finally, Rubin (2001) proposes ”Rubin’s B”: ”the absolute standardized difference of the
means of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched) non-treated group”
and ”Rubin’s R”: ”the ratio of treated to (matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score
index”. The recommendation is that the B is below 25 and the R between 0.5 and 2, in order to
conclude that the matched samples are sufficiently balanced (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). This is
verified for all estimation outcomes except for wages on Rubin’s B, which is just barely outside the
proposed interval.
On Appendix IV we change matching options, from the propensity score matching on nearest
neighbor to the propensity score matching on 5 nearest neighbors. Also, we try the no replacement
option. We recognize the change in magnitudes and statistical significance for some results, how-
ever this is a common inconvenience when changing matching methods. For even more credible
analysis, we utilize propensity score matching with radius matching, with two different calipers
(0.001 and 0.00001)11. Finally, we also use an alternate package, -teffects psmatch-, in order to
verify our results are in fact consistent. This package has the advantage of directly computing
standard errors taking into account that the propensity scores are estimated.
10There are a few exceptions where the variance ratio falls outside the proposed interval by the literature. However,
we verified that the covariates scoring outside the interval actually help balance the remaining ones, and that is the
reason for not dropping them from the matching process.
11Abadie and Imbens (2008)’s criticism of bootstrapping processes also applies for radius matching. Thus, we also
perform these estimations using their correction for the standard errors.
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All in all, our estimation procedures pass the broad majority of these tests. The bulk of our
robustness checks lend credibility to the affirmation that the matching procedure was effective, and
that our results are valid.
8 Results
Table 2: Results
ATT Std. Error T - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.2009+ 0.1034 1.94 [-0.0018 , 0.4036]
Total Assets 0.1097∗∗ 0.0411 2.67 [0.0290 , 0.1903]
Fixed Assets 0.0986∗ 0.0495 2.35 [0.0161 , 0.1811]
Labor Productivity -0.0734+ 0.0430 -1.71 [-0.1576 , 0.011]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0021 0.0025 0.85 [-0.0028 , 0.0070]
Employment 0.0779∗ 0.0394 1.98 [0.0007 , 0.1551]
Wages -0.0214 0.0334 -0.64 [-0.0869 , 0.0441]
EBITDA -0.0805 0.0759 -1.06 [-0.2292 , 0.0683]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
The outcomes of interest analyzed are eight: the impact on credit, labor productivity as de-
fined by Gouveia (2019), Total Factor Productivity as defined by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
fixed assets, total assets, employment, wages, and EBITDA. For all outcomes, we focus on the
ATT growth rate change in percentual points - we define each outcome variable as the difference
between the natural logarithm of the variable between 2018 and 2013 (e.g., Credit = ln(Credit2018)
- ln(Credit2013)). The results are presented in Table 2.
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It is important to mention that, out of the 453 treated firms available12, 432 are micro or small
firms, with only 21 being medium or large. Since we are looking at the average treatment effect on
the treated, this information will be important in understanding the results.
Starting by credit, we find statistically significant evidence of an increase in the growth rate
of obtained credit of 20 pp. This result goes in line with what would be expected: treated firms
have access to more credit. Also, we argue that there may be one other mechanism helping treated
firms obtain credit: treated firms undergo thorough assessment by SPGM, and when they receive
access to the credit guarantee they are signaled to all of the banking system as relatively safer then
their untreated counterparts. What this means is that aside from the direct effect of the financial
additionality these firms enjoy, an indirect effect of positive signalling contributes to making it
relatively easier for them to find financing in future occasions that are independent from the treat-
ment program. This is an educated guess at a possible mechanism, but we do not prove this in our
analysis.
Total assets growth rate for treated firms increases on average 11 pp. Given the increase in
credit, it is logical to see an increase in the acquisition of total assets by the treated firms.
Fixed assets are positively affected as well. We find an increase in the growth of fixed assets
compared to control group firms of about 10 pp. The result is statistically significant, and it follows
closely the change in growth rate for total assets.
Turning to labor productivity, we see a decrease on the treated group of 7 pp. The negative
coefficient had us question the results. Thus, we checked the results for the average treatment
effect, and the average treatment effect of the untreated, and it turns out both are also negative.
12This number reports to the total treated firms we dispose in our database in 2018, and not the 2007 total. They
differ because in 2007 some firms that are in our treatment database did not exist yet, or because they have missing
values on the outcome variables. This has been highlighted in the Data Description section, where we present the total
number in 2007 as being around 350, depending on the outcome variable.
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This provides clues that suggest the existence of downward drivers of Portugal’s labor productivity
not related to the program being analysed. This will be discussed in the conclusion section.
As for Total Factor Productivity growth ratio, the ATT coefficient is positive, but it is not
statistically significant. Since productivity measures are some of the most important economic
outcomes, finding negative impact on labor productivity and no impact on total factor productivity
is a concern to keep in mind. As mentioned in the literature review in citing Oh et al. (2009), the
policy may be impairing the process of creative destruction.
Employment manifests a statistically significant increase of 8 pp for the treated firms. This
policy, thus, leads to extra job creation.
The growth rate of the wages of employees are not affected by the program. This is coherent
with our findings that labor productivity is not positively impacted on firms that receive the policy.
The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciations and amortizations - EBITDA - present no
statistically significant increase, and a negative coefficient: -8 pp.
As a concluding note, we make a remark on the magnitude of our estimates, going back to the
second paragraph of this section. We are looking mostly at firms of very small dimension, where
apparently small variations in absolute totals translate into high relative changes.
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9 Conclusion
The attribution of public credit guarantees to SMEs increased greatly after the Great Recession
(2008-2009) and the sovereign debt crisis (2011-2013). Seen as a way of preventing credit rationing
to SMEs, the focus on the evaluation of such policies is often the financial additionality. This
paper mainly analyzed the economic additionality of the policy and the conclusions are mixed -
mimicking available literature for other countries. On the one hand, there is a positive impact on
access to credit (i.e., there is financial additionality), total assets, fixed assets and job creation.
There seems to be a negative effect on labor productivity. On the other hand, the policy is not
effective in impacting the growth rate of total factor productivity, wages, and EBITDA. Looking
back at the literature review, our results are closer to the evidence from countries like Italy, France,
or South Korea, than the results found for Spain or Portugal.
Our data has limitations that we have highlighted over our work. We do not have information
to determine exactly when the credit guarantee was attributed, so we develop a method to overcome
this, by estimating propensity scores for firms in 2007 and matching them in that same year. Since
SPGM (2018b) itself describes that the credit guarantee attributions only became truly relevant
after the 2008-09 period, this seems like a relatively safe identification strategy for us.
Adding to this, we trust our point estimates, but must recognize that our confidence intervals
are considerably large - a result stemming from having a relatively small number of treated firms
available to work with, and also of employing a quantitative analysis strategy that relies on two-step
estimations.
Here, we will discuss our results at a 10% significance level. We find that treated firms grow
on assets and create more employment. They show no signs of growing on productivity. The report
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by OECD (2019) provides a deep analysis into the issue of productivity. It details how employment
has been rising across OECD countries but mainly in low productivity and low wage jobs, bringing
with it a decrease in the overall labor productivity. This is even more relevant in our context as we
are dealing with mainly micro and small firms. The report also offers detail into Portugal’s own
situation: the labor productivity growth shows, on average, a decreasing trend from 2010 to 2018 -
with barely existent labor productivity growth from 2014 to 2018. For what the OECD defines as
Multifactor Productivity, it can also be seen that Portugal is stagnant on that measure. The figures
that show this can be seen on Appendix V. Although the OECD relies on different methodologies
for estimating productivity measures, their findings are similar to ours. And it is worth noting that
OECD’s findings account for the whole of portuguese firms - not just SMEs. So, as it stands, this
seems to be a structural problem of the portuguese economy, and not particularly related to the
policy at hand.
Is the process of creative destruction being impaired by these policies? Should firms that
do not contribute towards overall economic productivity growth and wages growth continue to be
supported, even if they create employment? These are questions that future research could ad-
dress, with a focus on what is most suitable for the overall macroeconomic scenario. Additional
research for Portugal is necessary to understand what are the root causes for low-to-none produc-
tivity growth, and possible guides for future policy making.
Finally, it becomes clear that an increase in independent policy evaluation is necessary. Ac-
cess to more complete data on future researches is fundamental for better policy evaluation. Further




Abadie, A. and G. W. Imbens (2006). Large sample properties of matching estimators for average
treatment effects. econometrica 74(1), 235–267.
Abadie, A. and G. W. Imbens (2008). On the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators.
Econometrica 76(6), 1537–1557.
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Appendixes
Appendix I - Variables Definition
Credit = ln(Long-term Credit2018)− ln(Long-term Credit2013) (1)
Total Assets = ln(Total Assets2018)− ln(Total Assets2013) (2)





VABit = Productionit − Intermediate Costsit + Operating Subsidiesit − Indirect Taxesit (5)
Productionit = Turnoverit + Changes in stocksit + Own work capitalisedit+ (6)
+Supplementary incomeit
Intermediate Costsit = Cost of goods sold and materials consumedit+ (7)
External supplies and servicesit
Equivalent Full - Time Workersit(EFTW) = Full-time workersit + 0.5 ∗ Part-time workersit (8)
Total Factor Productivity: See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (9)







EBITDA = ln(EBITDA2018)− ln(EBITDA2013) (12)




CAE: Portuguese definition of economic activity sectors. See INE (2007) (14)










Appendix II - Bootstrapped Results
Table 3: Bootstrapped Results - 200 repetitions
ATT Std. Error Z - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.2009 0.1308 1.54 [-0.0554 , 0.4573]
Total Assets 0.1097+ 0.060 1.82 [-0.0087 , 0.2280]
Fixed Assets 0.0992 0.1111 1.08 [-0.0975 , 0.3379]
Labor Productivity -0.0734 0.048 -1.52 [-0.1681 , 0.0218]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0021 0.0031 0.68 [-0.0040 , 0.0082]
Employment 0.0779+ 0.0404 1.93 [-0.0014 , 0.1572]
Wages -0.0214 0.043 -0.49 [-0.1067 , 0.0638]
EBITDA -0.0805 0.1011 -0.80 [-0.2786 , 0.1176]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
2
**** BALANCING TESTS *****
* CREDIT
Log likelihood = -1476.7812                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0161
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |  -.2177492   .2615744    -0.83   0.405    -.7304256    .2949272
longcreditpc07 |   .1609716   .1486454     1.08   0.279    -.1303679    .4523112
          cae3 |  -.0000194   2.96e-06    -6.55   0.000    -.0000252   -.0000136
         age07 |   -.000236   .0051232    -0.05   0.963    -.0102774    .0098053
  debtassetr07 |  -.2807261   .2469456    -1.14   0.256    -.7647305    .2032783
         _cons |  -3.521446    .214183   -16.44   0.000    -3.941237   -3.101655
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .30269   .27663     11.2 |   1.44  0.150 |  1.00
longcreditpc07          | .32695   .29049      8.8 |   1.05  0.296 |  1.04
cae3                    |  37802    37949     -0.7 |  -0.09  0.926 |  0.98
age07                   | 23.786   24.562     -7.0 |  -0.79  0.427 |  0.77*
debtassetr07            | .25434   .24284      3.6 |   0.65  0.514 |  0.84
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.79; 1.27]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.005      3.74    0.587      6.3       7.0      16.5    0.87      20
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
Appendix III - Balancing Tests
3
*TOTAL ASSETS
Log likelihood = -2083.3085                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0193
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |   .1197925   .2221053     0.54   0.590    -.3155259     .555111
longcreditpc07 |   .3071381   .1279497     2.40   0.016     .0563612     .557915
          cae3 |  -.0000213   2.52e-06    -8.47   0.000    -.0000263   -.0000164
         age07 |  -.0037951   .0046019    -0.82   0.410    -.0128146    .0052244
         _cons |   -4.10162   .1801391   -22.77   0.000    -4.454686   -3.748554
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29319   .27473      8.0 |   1.12  0.264 |  0.91
longcreditpc07          | .29759   .26097      9.2 |   1.22  0.224 |  1.06
cae3                    |  38264    37525      3.7 |   0.52  0.601 |  0.94
age07                   |  23.41   24.017     -5.4 |  -0.74  0.459 |  0.86
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.23]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.004      3.63    0.459      6.6       6.7      14.3    1.02       0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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*FIXED ASSETS
Log likelihood = -2000.2397                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0181
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |  -.0135032   .2302872    -0.06   0.953    -.4648578    .4378514
longcreditpc07 |   .3190963    .132046     2.42   0.016     .0602909    .5779018
          cae3 |  -.0000205   2.55e-06    -8.03   0.000    -.0000255   -.0000155
         age07 |  -.0043119   .0046719    -0.92   0.356    -.0134687     .004845
  debtassetr07 |  -.0845762   .1806224    -0.47   0.640    -.4385897    .2694373
         _cons |   -3.99814   .1869652   -21.38   0.000    -4.364585   -3.631695
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            |  .2983   .27924      8.2 |   1.11  0.268 |  0.83
longcreditpc07          | .30333    .2866      4.2 |   0.54  0.592 |  0.97
cae3                    |  38220    37932      1.4 |   0.20  0.842 |  0.93
age07                   | 23.552   23.863     -2.8 |  -0.38  0.703 |  0.94
debtassetr07            | .24311   .23688      1.8 |   0.36  0.718 |  0.62*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.24]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.002      1.68    0.891      3.7       2.8       9.9    0.83      20
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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*LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
Log likelihood = -2008.3238                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0201
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |   .1248681   .2297712     0.54   0.587    -.3254751    .5752113
longcreditpc07 |   .2987633   .1316803     2.27   0.023     .0406747    .5568518
          cae3 |  -.0000217   2.56e-06    -8.48   0.000    -.0000267   -.0000167
         age07 |  -.0044101   .0047197    -0.93   0.350    -.0136605    .0048404
  debtassetr07 |   -.023207   .1449163    -0.16   0.873    -.3072376    .2608237
         _cons |  -3.993691   .1861726   -21.45   0.000    -4.358583   -3.628799
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29589    .2668     12.7 |   1.76  0.078 |  0.94
longcreditpc07          |  .2961   .27486      5.3 |   0.69  0.489 |  1.00
cae3                    |  37927    37334      2.9 |   0.41  0.680 |  0.91
age07                   | 23.402   24.069     -5.9 |  -0.77  0.444 |  0.73*
debtassetr07            | .24454   .24169      0.8 |   0.16  0.873 |  0.56*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.24]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.004      4.09    0.537      5.5       5.3      15.4    0.88      40
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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* TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Log likelihood = -1962.9286                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0185
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |  -.0160685   .2342249    -0.07   0.945    -.4751409    .4430039
longcreditpc07 |   .3008215   .1325519     2.27   0.023     .0410244    .5606185
          cae3 |  -.0000208   2.57e-06    -8.07   0.000    -.0000258   -.0000157
         age07 |  -.0044578   .0047358    -0.94   0.347    -.0137399    .0048243
  debtassetr07 |  -.0084631   .1568564    -0.05   0.957    -.3158959    .2989698
         _cons |  -3.958654   .1883282   -21.02   0.000    -4.327771   -3.589538
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29803   .29027      3.4 |   0.47  0.641 |  0.96
longcreditpc07          | .30133   .25922     10.5 |   1.37  0.171 |  1.05
cae3                    |  37971    37230      3.6 |   0.51  0.609 |  0.94
age07                   | 23.512   24.141     -5.6 |  -0.72  0.470 |  0.76*
debtassetr07            | .24417   .24993     -1.7 |  -0.29  0.772 |  0.42*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.24]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.004      3.43    0.633      5.0       3.6      14.2    1.01      40
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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*EMPLOYMENT
Log likelihood = -2025.1617                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0200
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |   .0948394   .2287639     0.41   0.678    -.3535297    .5432084
longcreditpc07 |   .3072734   .1315711     2.34   0.020     .0493987     .565148
          cae3 |  -.0000216   2.55e-06    -8.49   0.000    -.0000266   -.0000167
         age07 |  -.0046492   .0046993    -0.99   0.322    -.0138596    .0045612
  debtassetr07 |  -.0503745   .1599363    -0.31   0.753    -.3638439     .263095
         _cons |  -3.991129   .1856192   -21.50   0.000    -4.354936   -3.627322
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29449   .28414      4.5 |   0.60  0.546 |  0.81
longcreditpc07          | .29727    .2618      8.9 |   1.17  0.244 |  1.03
cae3                    |  37966    37346      3.1 |   0.43  0.665 |  0.91
age07                   | 23.411   23.664     -2.2 |  -0.30  0.765 |  0.79*
debtassetr07            | .24328    .2503     -2.0 |  -0.33  0.739 |  0.34*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.23]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.002      2.31    0.805      4.1       3.1      11.5    0.90      40
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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*WAGES
Log likelihood = -1959.9048                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0191
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |   .1069661   .2328801     0.46   0.646    -.3494706    .5634028
longcreditpc07 |    .330467   .1327455     2.49   0.013     .0702906    .5906434
          cae3 |  -.0000209   2.58e-06    -8.09   0.000    -.0000259   -.0000158
         age07 |   -.004848   .0047471    -1.02   0.307    -.0141522    .0044561
  debtassetr07 |  -.0467747   .1628573    -0.29   0.774    -.3659691    .2724196
         _cons |  -3.989954   .1884462   -21.17   0.000    -4.359302   -3.620606
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29647   .27457      9.6 |   1.32  0.187 |  0.96
longcreditpc07          | .30348   .28674      4.2 |   0.53  0.596 |  0.97
cae3                    |  37992    37331      3.3 |   0.46  0.648 |  0.94
age07                   | 23.537   25.171    -14.4 |  -1.77  0.076 |  0.64*
debtassetr07            | .24136   .19895     12.1 |   2.72  0.007 |  0.88
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.24]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.012     11.44    0.043      8.7       9.6      26.0*    0.70     20
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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*EBITDA
Log likelihood = -1926.7631                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0189
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   treat14to17 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  collateral07 |   .1125562   .2325204     0.48   0.628    -.3431754    .5682879
longcreditpc07 |   .2962204   .1356177     2.18   0.029     .0304146    .5620262
          cae3 |   -.000021   2.60e-06    -8.08   0.000    -.0000261   -.0000159
         age07 |  -.0067377   .0049551    -1.36   0.174    -.0164496    .0029742
  debtassetr07 |  -.0831817   .1789018    -0.46   0.642    -.4338228    .2674595
         _cons |  -3.973149    .191998   -20.69   0.000    -4.349459    -3.59684
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        |       Mean               |     t-test    |  V(T)/
Variable                | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| |  V(C)
------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+----------
collateral07            | .29779   .27945      7.9 |   1.08  0.278 |  0.94
longcreditpc07          | .29616   .26986      6.6 |   0.84  0.403 |  1.00
cae3                    |  38382    38116      1.3 |   0.18  0.855 |  0.93
age07                   | 23.124   22.703      3.8 |   0.52  0.606 |  0.91
debtassetr07            | .24138   .22403      4.9 |   0.75  0.456 |  0.28*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* if variance ratio outside [0.81; 1.24]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B       R     %Var 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
0.003      2.44    0.785      4.9       4.9      12.2    0.86      20
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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Appendix IV - Other Matching Methods
Table 4: Nearest-Neighbor Matching: 5 Neighbors
ATT Std. Error T - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.1976∗ 0.085 2.31 [0.0302 , 0.3650]
Total Assets 0.0800∗∗ 0.0303 2.64 [0.0205 , 0.1395]
Fixed Assets 0.0695+ 0.0738 1.86 [-0.0709 , 0.2185]
Labor Productivity -0.0856∗∗ 0.0327 -2.62 [-0.1497 , -0.0215]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0029 0.0020 1.44 [-0.0011 , 0.0069]
Employment 0.0659∗ 0.0295 2.24 [0.0082 , 0.1237]
Wages -0.0303 0.0260 -1.17 [-0.0812 , 0.0206]
EBITDA -0.0458 0.0549 -0.83 [-0.1534 , 0.0619]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 5: Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement
ATT Std. Error T - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.0275 0.1199 0.23 [-0.2075 , 0.2623]
Total Assets 0.1097∗∗ 0.0411 2.67 [0.0292 , 0.1901]
Fixed Assets 0.0814 0.0954 1.53 [-0.041 , 0.3328]
Labor Productivity -0.0719+ 0.0419 -1.72 [-0.1541 , 0.0102]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0024 0.0024 1.00 [-0.0023 , 0.0072]
Employment 0.0770∗ 0.0392 1.97 [0.0003 , 0.1538]
Wages -0.0214 0.0338 -0.63 [-0.0876 , 0.0448]
EBITDA -0.0701 0.0742 -0.94 [-0.2157 , 0.0753]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 6: Radius Matching with 0.001 caliper
ATT Std. Error T - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.2103∗∗ 0.0739 2.85 [0.0655 , 0.3551]
Total Assets 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0270 3.32 [0.0368 , 0.1428]
Fixed Assets 0.0755 0.0954 1.53 [-0.0247 , 0.2377]
Labor Productivity -0.0669∗ 0.0303 -2.21 [-0.1262 , -0.0076]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0038∗ 0.0018 2.07 [0.0002 , 0.0074]
Employment 0.0479+ 0.0266 1.80 [-0.0042 , 0.1001]
Wages -0.0213 0.0234 -0.91 [-0.0672 , 0.0246]
EBITDA -0.0351 0.0481 -0.73 [-0.1293 , 0.0592]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 7: Radius matching with 0.00001 caliper
ATT Std. Error T - Stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.1715∗ 0.0778 2.21 [0.0191 , 0.3239]
Total Assets 0.0857∗∗ 0.0275 3.12 [0.0318 , 0.1396]
Fixed Assets 0.0694 0.0680 1.51 [-0.0307 , 0.2357]
Labor Productivity -0.0709∗ 0.0307 -2.31 [-0.1310 , -0.0108]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0033+ 0.0019 1.79 [-0.0003 , 0.0070]
Employment 0.0571∗ 0.0270 2.11 [0.0041 , 0.1101]
Wages -0.0200 0.0238 -0.84 [-0.0666 , 0.0266]
EBITDA -0.0323 0.0488 -0.66 [-0.1280 , 0.0633]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 8: Using -teffects psmatch- with Abadie-Imbens Standard Errors
ATT Std. Error Z - stat 95% Conf. Interval
Credit 0.2009∗ 0.0120 1.97 [0.0010 , 0.4009]
Total Assets 0.0804+ 0.0437 1.84 [-0.0053 , 0.1661]
Fixed Assets 0.0721 0.0920 1.31 [-0.0602 , 0.3005]
Labor Productivity -0.0734+ 0.0435 -1.69 [-0.1586 , 0.0118]
Total Factor Productivity 0.0021 0.0024 0.87 [-0.0027 , 0.0069]
Employment 0.0779∗ 0.0386 2.02 [0.0022 , 0.1536]
Wages -0.0214 0.0330 -0.65 [-0.0861 , 0.0433]
EBITDA -0.0805 0.0763 -1.06 [-0.2300 , 0.0690]
+ p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Appendix V - OECD Productivity figures
Figure 2: Labour productivity growth in the OECD (OECD, 2019)
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Figure 3: Multifactor productivity growth in the OECD (OECD, 2019)
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